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“For me it is an absurdity to ascribe physical properties to ‘space’.” Albert Einstein to Ernst
Mach, December 1913.1
“That a real thing has to be presupposed as the cause for the preference of inertial systems
over non-inertial systems is a fact that physicists have only come to understand in recent years.”
Einstein 1924.2
Abstract
Einstein regarded as one of the triumphs of his 1915 theory of gravity — the general theory
of relativity — that it vindicated the action–reaction principle, while Newtonian mechanics as
well as his 1905 special theory of relativity supposedly violated it. In this paper we examine
why Einstein came to emphasise this position several years after the development of general
relativity. Several key considerations are relevant to the story: the connection Einstein originally
saw between Mach’s analysis of inertia and both the equivalence principle and the principle
of general covariance, the waning of Mach’s influence owing to de Sitter’s 1917 results, and
Einstein’s detailed correspondence with Moritz Schlick in 1920.
1 Introduction
It was striking in the 2012 IIAS seminar The Nature of Reality . . . that so many speakers inde-
pendently referred to the quip by Albert Einstein in his 1930 dialogue with Rabindranath Tagore
that he, Einstein, was more religious than the great Bengali polymath. Of course what Einstein
was getting at is the fact that at the heart of the physical sciences, at least as he saw it, is a
commitment to the reality of an external world whose goings-on are governed by laws that contain
1Vol. 5, Doc. 495, The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (CPAE for short from now on). All translations from
Einstein texts are based on the corresponding translation volumes of the CPAE unless otherwise noted; in some cases
slight modifications of translation have been introduced.
2Einstein [1924], p. 88. Translation by DL.
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no fundamental reference to conscious agents, and in particular to human observers. For Tagore,
all truth is human truth, if one is to take his claims literally.3 For Einstein, ultimate truth about
the physical world transcends the human realm. Einstein was a “realist”, but his realism was of a
modest, or non-metaphysical kind. It is the job of physicists, he argued, to come up with models
of a mind-independent reality that are explanatory of our phenomenological experiences of natu-
ral regularities, within the laboratory and without. However, whether such models, when judged
successful, correspond to the way the world “really” is, is a question Einstein thought best to leave
aside. There are some philosophical questions for which Einstein thought the best response is a
smile, and this was one of them. But Einstein stressed that even this weak, pragmatic take on truth
involved a leap of faith. He made it clear, particularly in his 1949 Autobiographical Notes, that
Nature’s connivance in allowing for the success in the scientific venture as he conceived it could not
be a foregone conclusion.4 It was conceivable for Einstein that mind, say, could be the bedrock of
reality, but he felt that there was no good reason to start with that premiss, and good reasons not
to. Realism for Einstein was more a program than a doctrine; it was a dogma about which he was
careful not to be dogmatic.
Several years after the development of his 1915 general theory of relativity (GR), Einstein
began to stress that physical space, or rather the metric field, not only constitutes a fundamental,
autonomous element of objective reality, it plays a causal role in accounting for the inertial motion
of bodies.5 He compared this with the active role of space in the cases of Newtonian mechanics
(NM) and special relativity (SR). In these cases, such putative action is clearly not reciprocated
by bodies or fields: they do not act back on space-time structure, so the so-called action–reaction
principle is violated. In contrast, in his relativistic theory of gravity GR, Einstein was to see the
vindication of the principle. The metric can have a dynamical life of its own in the absence of
matter fields (though, as we shall see, this goes against Einstein’s original expectations) but, more
to the point, when the latter exist, the metric affects and is affected by them.6
Whether Einstein’s reasoning is correct is open to doubt. What is debatable is not the claim that
GR is consistent with the action–reaction principle, it is the claim that the older theories involving
absolute space-time structures are not. More specifically, it is the assertion that such structures
act in the relevant sense. Clearly, if they do not (as Newton himself argued regarding space; see
below), then the fact that material bodies do not act back on them constitutes no violation of
the action–reaction principle. The case for the view that absolute space-time structures of the
kind that appear in NM and SR are not fundamental causal entities in their own right, but rather
codifications of certain bare facts concerning the movement of bodies or behaviour of fields, has been
3For an insightful analysis of the Einstein-Tagore dialogues, see Home and Robinson [1995].
4See Einstein [1949]; for related remarks see Einstein [1948], reprinted and translated as “Quantum mechanics and
reality” in Born [1971]. Very helpful analyses of Einstein’s philosophical position(s) can be found in Howard [1984],
Howard [1993], Fine [1996], van Dongen [2010], chapter 2, and Norton [forthcoming].
5A discussion of the ‘principle of causality’ is particularly prominent in the Einstein-Schlick correspondence as
reviewed in section 4. However, note that at the time it was quite common not to draw a clear distinction between
causality and determinism; in many cases, demanding that the ‘principle of causality’ holds is equivalent to demanding
that every event has a determining cause or set of causes. For our discussion, the important point is that in the
beginning 1920s Einstein started to think of the metric field as (causally) determining things, rather than just being
determined by the distribution of masses.
6 In a Lagrangian framework (which Einstein started to use extensively from 1918 onwards), this mutual affection
can be represented by the metric and the matter fields (both dynamical) coupling to each other. The stress-energy
tensor, however, turns out to be a relational property of the matter fields, which they posses in virtue of their relations
to the metric field. For a recent discussion of the relational significance of the stress-energy tensor, see Lehmkuhl
[2011]; section 4.3 for different kinds of coupling.
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made a number of times, in different ways.7 One curious instance is arguably in a letter Einstein
himself wrote to Ernst Mach in late 1913;8 another is due to Moritz Schlick in correspondence with
Einstein in 1920.9 We shall return to the second case below; it turns out to be directly related to
the main concern of this paper, which is why would Einstein start systematically emphasising the
action–reaction principle in his defence of GR only in the 1920s.
2 The action–reaction principle
It is a venerable tradition in natural philosophy to assert that a substance is the seat of actions on
other substances, and in turn subject to the actions of these other substances – the action–reaction
principle (AR). In his pre-Principia manuscript De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum10 (or
De Grav for short), Newton insisted that natural philosophers tacitly understand substance as an
entity that acts on things, even if they don’t state this explicitly. He distinguished two kinds of
action, one which stimulates the perceptions of thinking beings, and one between material bodies,
as in collisions. (Later he would extend this second kind to action at a distance.11) This distinction
today seems of little import, and the fundamental premiss that it is interactions between systems
that count in physics, and not their intrinsic properties, is close to the heart of the ‘structural
realist’ position that has been much discussed in recent years in the philosophy of science. Be that
as it may, Newton is clearly appealing to a principle in the De Grav that is more fundamental and
general than what he would later designate as his third law of motion in the Principia – though
the latter is often referred to as the law of action–reaction. (We shall see shortly how space, for
Newton, is a kind of exception to this fundamental principle.)
Leibniz, whose views on the nature of space and time were so different to Newton’s, nonetheless
shared the same intuition. In fact, when defining substance as that which acts and can be acted
upon, he understood he was adopting the view of the scholastics.12 Caution must be exercised
however in attributing AR, as it is standardly understood today, to Leibniz. In the light of his
doctrine of pre-established harmony, the meaning of causation, or rather interaction, within his
deep metaphysics is almost certainly at odds with those views adopted by the majority of current
metaphysicians,13 not to mention physicists — and its scope is still controversial.14
If there is a questionable aspect of AR, it is less the claim that substances act (how otherwise
could their existence be known to us?) than the notion that they are necessarily acted back upon,
that action must be reciprocal. If all substances act, they do so in relation to other substances;
these other substances therefore cannot be immune from external influences. Now it might seem
arbitrary on a priori grounds to imagine that the ‘sensitivity’ of such substances is not universal.
7For recent versions of this argument, see Brown and Pooley [2006] and Brown [2007]. It should be noted that
these analyses differ from Newton’s, in the sense that there is no commitment to the reality of space as a fundamental
entity.
8Vol. 5, Doc. 495, CPAE.
9Schlick to Einstein, 10 June 1920, Vol. 10 Doc. 51 CPAE.
10A translation is found in Hall and Hall [1962]. The date of this important manuscript is still a matter of dispute.
There is little doubt that it was written between 1666 and 1685; for details of the conflicting views on the likely date,
and a defence of the early claim, see Henry [2011].
11Ibid.
12Leibniz made this point in a 1700 letter to Bernoulli; see Gerhardt [1858], volume III.
13See for example Ishiguro [1993] and Woolhouse [1985].
14See for example Brown [1992] for a careful discussion of the question whether pre-established harmony applies in
Leibniz’s philosophy at the level of aggregate substances.
3
That is to say, it might seem arbitrary to suppose that not all substances react to others. But no
such abstract qualms can be entirely compelling; Nature must have the last say.
Nowadays, it is well-known in the foundations of physics that the de Broglie-Bohm (“pilot-
wave”) interpretation of quantum mechanics, in its standard form, involves a dynamical agent
(the wavefunction) that acts on corpuscles (point particles) but is not acted back upon, at least
by the corpuscles. It is noteworthy that David Bohm himself clearly found such violation of AR
uncomfortable in his (first) 1952 formulation of the theory, and attempted to remedy it, as have
others after him.15 While defenders of the original pilot-wave theory can legitimately argue that
AR is not a logical necessity, others see its violation as a blemish in the theory.16 It seems fair to
say that currently within the physics community there is no consensus supporting the failure of AR
in quantum theory.
For his part, Einstein himself had already stated in 1922 that it is “contrary to the mode of
scientific thinking to conceive of a thing . . . which acts itself, but which cannot be acted upon”.17
The object of Einstein’s ire in 1922 was NM and his own creation, SR. Yet there is no hint in
his writings around the time of the development of SR in 1905 that Einstein considered either of
these theories to incorporate a violation of the action–reaction principle; at any rate the explicit
condemnation came later. Why? In all probability because it was part of an honest sales pitch for
GR, his greatest and most radical contribution to science, after Einstein was reluctantly forced to
concede, because of results by de Sitter, that the theory as a whole was not consistent with “Mach’s
Principle”, even though special solutions are. It seems that this change of tack on Einstein’s part was
consolidated in the mentioned 1920 correspondence with the physicist-philosopher Moritz Schlick.
But before examining the evolution of Einstein’s views on the causal role of space-time, it is
worth briefly visiting Newton’s own views on the nature of absolute space, especially as expounded
in the De Grav. This manuscript contains a hard-hitting critique of Descartes’ relational theory
of motion, and the positive reasons why Newton felt compelled to posit the existence of absolute
space; these important lines of reasoning have been discussed extensively in the literature.18 What
concerns us is Newton’s insistence that space, despite its reality, does not act on either our sense
organs (which is patent) or on bodies. If it is a substance, it is by Newton’s own reasoning sui
generis in its causal inefficacy, and ultimately Newton had no interest in classifying it as either
substance or accident.19
When, in the context of discussions relevant to this essay, Newtonian space is assigned a causal
role, it is usually to account for inertia, i.e. the privileged existence of inertial frames, or equivalently
the special motions of force-free bodies. In the De Grav, Newton explicitly renounced such a role.
He stated that the reason why projectiles that are not being acted upon by other bodies move in
straight lines and uniform speed is precisely that space has no ability to help or hinder any change
in the motion of bodies!20
15See Squires [1994].
16See Anandan and Brown [1995].
17Einstein [1922].
18See Stein [1967], Barbour [2001], Chapter 11, Rynasiewicz [1995a,b], and Pooley [forthcoming], Chapter 2.
19de Grav (see note 7 above), section 7. The inspiration for Newton’s view that space is neither substance nor
accident may have been the Renaissance thinker Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, or indeed Walter Charleton. See in
particular Pooley [forthcoming], section 2.1, for a discussion of possible influences on Newton in this regard. A
translation of and commentary on Patrizi’s “De Spacio Physico” can be found in Patrizi [1943].
20de Grav (see note 7 above), section 5.
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3 Einstein on absolute space
3.1 Einstein and Mach
Einstein’s tortuous road to the 1915 field equations of his unhappily-named general theory of
relativity followed a number of fundamental, partially overlapping, conceptual signposts, apart from
the requirement of securing the Newtonian limit in the case of suitably defined weak gravitational
fields. These were the so-called equivalence principle, which connects gravitational effects with
inertia; Mach’s ideas concerning the origins of inertia; the principle of the relativity of motion, and
finally the conservation of energy-momentum. It is probably no exaggeration to say that none of
these guiding principles was to survive fully intact once the promised land was reached. In this
section we shall be concerned in particular with Mach’s influence on Einstein’s thinking, because
its demise is intimately connected with the appearance of AR in Einstein’s arsenal of arguments in
favour of GR. The story of Einstein’s debt to Mach has of course received considerable attention
in the literature;21 we shall deal only with those elements that are necessary for our ends.
3.2 Mach
Ernst Mach’s own thinking on inertia is usefully divided into strands: his critique of Newtonian
mechanics, more specifically of absolute space and time, and his somewhat vague and varied sug-
gestions as to how to remedy the theory. As for the first strand, Mach’s central objection to NM is
that in appealing to motion with respect to absolute space in accounting, say, for centrifugal effects
in rotating bodies, one is being unfaithful to the fundamental aim of science, which has to do with
providing an economic systematization of experience. Space is not observable, so a purportedly
fundamental epistemological (or perhaps better methodological) principle requires us, according to
Mach, to refer only to motion relative to other bodies. It is not entirely clear that Mach sees space
as ‘acting’ on a rotating body within the standard Newtonian account; and anyway there appears
to be no hint of a complaint in Mach’s writings that it violates the action–reaction principle. The
issue is the methodological/epistemological role of observables in physics associated with Mach’s
brand of empiricism, not the metaphysics of action.
Further insight into Mach’s thinking is seen in the second, positive strand. Opinion is divided
as to whether he was suggesting a reformulation of Newtonian mechanics or a new, distinct theory
accounting for the inertial motion of bodies. John Norton, for example, is skeptical about the
seriousness of Mach’s revolutionary intentions;22 Julian Barbour is not. Barbour indeed provides
powerful textual evidence that Mach, on at least one occasion, was searching for an explanation of
the inertia (as opposed to inertial mass) of a force-free body, i.e. its uniform, rectilinear motion,
in terms of distant bodies, in analogy with the explanation of the acceleration of a body resulting
from the gravitational influence of distant masses – an account which would yield the Newtonian
predictions to a good approximation in the case of a universe populated to the extent ours is.23
There are three points to be made at this stage. First, if Mach’s concern were (counterfactually)
truly AR, would it be beyond the bounds of reasonableness to suppose he might have sought to
make space dynamical, and capable of being acted on by bodies? There is no hint of this possibility
21See particularly Barbour [1990], Norton [1995b], Hoefer [1995, 1994], Renn [2007]; and see Lehmkuhl
[forthcoming].
22Norton [1995b].
23Barbour [1995], section 2. Note that this paper also defends a version of Machianism that, unlike Mach’s own
version, is consistent with (certain solutions of) the field equations of GR.
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in Mach’s writings, despite the fact that dynamical notions of space had already been proposed in
1872 by Zo¨llner and independently in 1876 by Clifford.24 Mach in fact showed considerable interest
in non-Euclidean geometry, and thought it probable, but not inevitable, that it would have no
role to play in physics. If it did, it would for Mach only be through the behaviour of observable,
material bodies, and there was no evidence for it when he wrote essays for The Monist which would
be published collectively as Space and Geometry in 1906. He thought that the behaviour of matter
was as unlikely to indicate the reality of non-Euclidean geometry as it would satisfy “the atomistic
fantasies of the physicist.”25
Second, it would seem that Mach’s gravitation-like proposal for the origin of inertia, and the
very existence of inertial frames, would involve action at a distance.26 In fact, it could be called
super-action-at-a-distance; the inertial motion of a body is being attributed to the existence of
celestial bodies so far away that their gravitational actions on it are negligible. The caveat is
that Mach’s own notion of causality was rather thin; Norton has called it “idiosyncratic”.27 Mach
saw physics as providing only functional dependencies between experiences; systematic correlations
rather than causal interactions (in so far as the distinction is meaningful). The commitment to the
notion that “the law of causality is sufficiently characterised by saying that it is the supposition of
the mutual dependence of phenomena” on Mach’s part28 perhaps explains why he was comfortable
enough with Newton’s picture of gravity to encourage the search of an analogous account of inertia.
However all this may be, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mach was not obviously concerned,
in the context of his analysis of inertia in NM, with the action–reaction principle or its violation, in
anything like the ordinary sense. (It is true that Mach provided an operational reading of inertial
mass based on Newton’s third law of motion, one that proved to be influential. But as we have
urged, the third law is not to be conflated with the AR principle.) In fact, a degree of resonance
is discernible between Mach’s view of the nature of causal connections and that of Leibniz, despite
the chasm between their views on metaphysics.
The third point is closely related to the second. An important aspect of Mach’s thinking about
inertia is the emphasis on the cosmological nature of its origins. It is not some subset of distant
bodies that determines the system of inertial frames; it is the totality of bodies in the universe.
Barbour has aptly connected this cosmological strand of Mach’s reasoning – the requirement of
self-referentiality in any adequate account of the observed world – with Kepler’s 1609 theory of
place and motion.29 Prior to 1917, the strand played only a minor role in Einstein’s thinking.
24Both of these figures were interested in non-Euclidean geometry, and eschewed Riemann’s separation of physics
from geometry. (For further discussion of their views, see Kragh [2012a], Kragh [2012b], where it is pointed out that
in 1872 Zo¨llner proposed a cosmological model describing a finite universe in closed space. A connection between
Zo¨llner’s suggestion of a cosmological underpinning of the force law in electrodynamics and “later versions of Mach’s
principle” is suggested in Kragh [2012a], p. 26.) It is unclear to us, however, just to what extent these views are fully
consistent with the action–reaction principle.
25Mach (1906), p. 136 and p. 141. See in this connection Kragh [2012a], p. 35.
26Indeed, in 1920, Einstein would explicitly reject Mach’s original reasoning as incorporating action at a distance;
see Einstein [1920b], p. 11. He would repeat the objection in Einstein [1924].
27Norton [1995b] p. 28.
28Mach [1872], p. 61; Mach’s emphasis.
29Barbour [1990], p. 48.
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3.3 Back to Einstein
Einstein’s decade-long love affair with Mach’s philosophy of inertia was complicated and tortuous.
The first complication is that Einstein entertained two quite distinct Mach-inspired doctrines, one
of which actually had no basis in Mach’s writings, as Barbour first emphasised in 1990.30 This was
the doctrine that the inertial mass of a body is to be explained as arising from the presence of other
bodies, with the consequence that a body at spatial infinity should have zero mass. (Mach himself
had no difficulty in viewing inertial mass as an intrinsic property of the body, and, as mentioned
above, used Newton’s third law to reveal its operational significance.) Indeed it was this idea of
the “relativity of inertia” that Einstein had in mind in his first endorsement of Mach’s reasoning
in a paper published in 1912.31
It has to be noted that this paper was written at a remarkable moment of time. In March
1912, Einstein had completed his final paper on a theory of static gravitational fields in which
gravity was represented by a scalar c, which was supposed to represent not only the gravitational
potential at the space-time point in question but also the speed of light at that very space-time
point.32 In August 1912, Einstein moved from Prague to Zurich, where his collaboration with
Marcel Grossmann began, one which culminated in the first paper33, propounding what is known
as the Entwurf theory, in which gravity is represented by a dynamical ten-component metric
tensor field gµν whose non-dynamical counterpart Einstein already knew from Minkowski’s 1908
formulation of special relativity. Thus, the cited 1912 paper was written only a few months before
Einstein learned about the powers of the metric tensor, and it is noteworthy that he had already
endorsed the idea of a relativity of inertia in the context of a relativistic theory of gravity.
Einstein states in the 1912 paper34 that the results he has obtained give support to the (alleged)
idea of Mach that the inertia of point masses is a result of the presence of other masses, that it
rested on an interaction (Wechselwirkung) of the point particle with those other masses. (Recall
that Mach himself did not use the term ‘interaction’ but spoke of mutual dependencies.35) We
find similar statements in the mentioned 1913 paper with Grossmann and another 1913 paper by
Einstein36; in each instance Einstein emphasises that the inertia of a body should be derived as
the result of an interaction of this body with other bodies.37 Also in 1913, Einstein wrote two
letters to Mach, the first in June, the second in December.38 In the June letter, Einstein writes
enthusiastically that in his Entwurf theory which he developed with Marcel Grossmann, “inertia
has its origin in some kind of interaction of the bodies, completely in the sense of your considerations
about Newton’s bucket experiment.” Despite the wording, careful reading of the letter makes it
clear that again Einstein is thinking of inertial mass rather than the inertial frame.39
30Op. cit., pp. 49-50. For further analysis, see in particular Hoefer [1995] and Lehmkuhl [forthcoming].
31Einstein [1912a].
32Einstein finally abandoned this theory primarily because he convinced himself that the theory was in conflict
with Newton’s third law, see Einstein [1912b], p. 452-458; and see Norton [1995a], section 5.1, for details.
33Einstein and Grossmann [1913].
34Einstein [1912a], p. 38.
35See Wolters [1987] for a comparison of Mach’s and Einstein’s choice of words, respectively.
36Einstein [1913], p.1260.
37Note that Einstein did not clearly distinguish between the relativity of inertia (the predecessor of ‘Mach’s principle’
as defined only in Einstein [1918], and the relativity of motion, as he himself admits of not having done up until
Einstein [1918]). For details on different versions of these principles and the development in Einstein’s thought see
the sources summarised in footnote 21.
38See Vol.5, Docs. 448 and 495, CPAE.
39In the letter, this becomes clear when Einstein directs Mach’s attention to a particular page in the Entwurf paper
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However, in a 1914 paper40, Einstein explicitly discussed Newton’s famous bucket thought
experiment and Mach’s criticism thereof — arguing that if we have a choice, we should go for
an account in which no absolute motion exists. Here, though not for the first time, Einstein is
advocating something much closer to Mach’s own concerns, and it was to dominate his thinking
for at least the next two years, as we shall see. At this point, it is worth noting that in his well-
known 1999 study of the principle of general covariance, John Norton argued that as early as 1913,
Einstein articulated a connection between Mach’s theory of inertia as he understood it and the
action–reaction principle, AR. Indeed, Norton sees concern with the violation of AR in pre-GR
space-time theories as “the enduring core of the cluster of ideas that led Einstein to the relativity
of inertia and Mach’s principle”.41 We shall defer discussion of this claim to section 4.4.
3.4 Hope of a solution?
How was the Machian positive program related primarily to inertial motion (rather than to inertial
mass) to be implemented? Essentially by finding a way to bypass it! Einstein was to link the
problem of inertial motion with a notion he expressed clearly in 1911, itself related to the equiv-
alence principle: that a uniformly accelerating reference frame (which reproduces all the effects of
a homogenous gravitational field) is no more absolute than an inertial frame. Indeed, he hoped
that his future theory of gravity would allow for a yet further generalisation of this putative ex-
tension of the Galilean-Einstein relativity principle – to all frames, such that the very distinction
between inertial and non-inertial motion would become relative, non-absolute.42 By 1912, Einstein
was convinced that the success of the complete “relativity of motion” would be guaranteed if the
gravitational field equations turned out to be generally covariant.43 What is important for our
purposes is that Einstein saw relativity of inertia, the principle of the relativity of motion and the
equivalence principle as walking hand in hand. As Barbour has stressed:
The drift of Einstein’s thought is now clear. Whereas the logic of Mach’s comments
called for explicit derivation of the distinguished local frames of reference from a re-
lational law of the cosmos as a whole, Einstein is working towards elimination of the
problem of the distinguished frames by asserting that they are not really distinguished
at all.44
Renn and Sauer have also emphasised essentially the same point (though with less emphasis on
the departure from Mach’s cosmological speculations):
Einstein’s view that it made sense to search for a generalization of the relativity prin-
ciple of classical mechanics and special relativity was . . . based on his acceptance of a
(p. 6), where he explicitly claims that the inertial mass of a body is a function of the gravitational potential in the
static limit of the Entwurf theory, which he then relates to Mach’s “bold idea” of a relativity of inertia.
40Einstein [1914], p. 74.
41Norton [1993], p. 810.
42See Norton [1993], section 3.1.
43When Einstein failed to find convincing generally covariant field equations, he convinced himself of their impos-
sibility with the now famous ‘hole argument’, only to return to the requirement of general covariance in launching
the ‘point-coincidence argument’ in 1915. See Stachel [1989], Earman and Norton [1987] Norton [1993] and Pooley
[forthcoming] for details, including references to criticism of Einstein’s equating the ‘general principle of relativity’
with general covariance.
44Barbour [1990], p. 53.
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philosophical critique of classical mechanics raised by Mach and others. According to
this critique, the justification of the privileged role of inertial frames of reference by the
notion of absolute space was problematic, while the inertial forces experienced in accel-
erated frames of reference require an explanation in terms of the interaction between
physical masses. Such an explanation would then eliminate any need for absolute space
as a causal agent in the analysis of motion. The generalized relativity principle would
go, so at least was Einstein’s expectation, a long way, and might actually go all the way,
towards an implementation of Mach’s critique of classical mechanics in the new theory
of gravitation.45
The culmination of this reasoning would appear in Einstein’s great review paper of 1916.
3.5 1916
At the start of his 1916 review paper on the new general theory of relativity,46 Einstein would
provide several (too many?) motivations for the requirement of general covariance; one of them
was Mach’s analysis of inertia. He went on to introduce a famous thought experiment involving
two fluid (i.e. not entirely rigid) bodies S1 and S2 in empty space rotating around each other at
constant angular velocity, and so far apart and isolated that the gravitational force between them
and all other bodies is negligible. Suppose it is a verifiable fact that body S1 is spherical in shape,
while body S2 is ellipsoidal. Einstein asserts that, in answering the question as to why this is so,
No answer can be admitted as epistemologically satisfactory, unless the reason given
is an observable fact of experience. The law of causality has not the significance of a
statement as to the world of experience, except when observable facts ultimately appear
as causes and effects.
Newtonian mechanics does not give a satisfactory answer to this question. It pro-
nounces as follows: The laws of mechanics apply to a space R1, in respect of which
the body S1 is at rest, but not to a space R2, in respect to which the body S2 is at
rest. But the privileged space R1 of Galileo, thus introduced, is merely a factitious
cause [fingierte Ursache], and not a thing that can be observed. It is therefore clear
that Newton’s mechanics does not really satisfy the requirement of causality in the case
under consideration, but only apparently does so, since it makes the factitious cause R1
responsible for the observable [shape] difference in the bodies S1 and S2.
It is clear in this passage that despite Einstein’s talk about the “law of causality” – for which
Mach’s understanding would probably be very different from Einstein’s – his critique of NM is
very similar to Mach’s, and it is explicitly described as epistemological in nature. Indeed, the
“epistemological” shortcoming of NM had already been mentioned by Einstein in 1913.47 But a
notable feature of Einstein’s Machianism is its selectivity. Mach rejected the existence of atoms
on essentially the same grounds that he rejected the existence of absolute space; Einstein did
not. By 1905, Einstein had made important contributions to the theory of capillarity, molecular
dimensions, and statistical mechanics — not to mention the nascent quantum theory. His 1905
paper on Brownian motion in particular would provide the basis for arguably the first significant
empirical evidence of the existence of atoms. As Don Howard has written:
45Renn and Sauer, p. 301.
46Einstein [1916a].
47See Hoefer [1995], p. 294.
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A careful reading, especially of Einstein’s papers on the foundations of statistical physics,
reveals that the influence of Mach and Ostwald was being felt. It was not, however, in
the form of any doubt about the reality of atoms, but in the form of a caution about
prematurely investing these atoms with any properties other than those necessary for
the purpose at hand. . . . It was thus not an ontology of unobservables that troubled
Einstein; it was merely an ontology that was richer than it need be.48
But the case of immaterial space was different. In his 1916 paper Einstein went on to claim that
the proper cause of the difference between the bodies S1 and S2 must be sought in the relations
between S1, S2 and other physical bodies, rather than in their relations to unobservable absolute
space.
These distant masses (and their motions relative to S1 and S2) must then be regarded
as the seat of the causes (which must be susceptible to observation) of the different
behaviour of our two bodies S1 and S2. They take over the role of the factitious cause
R1. Of all imaginable spaces R1, R2, etc., in any kind of of motion relatively to one
another, there is none which we may look upon as privileged a priori without reviving
the above-mentioned epistemological objection. The laws of physics must be of such a
nature that they apply to systems of reference in any kind of motion. Along this road
we arrive at an extension of the relativity principle.49
The connection in Einstein’s thinking between the problem of inertia and the generalised rel-
ativity principle is clearly stated here. In the previous year he had regained confidence in the
general covariance of the gravitational field equations (following the notorious struggle with his
“hole argument”) and thus found a purported solution to the Machian problem simply on the basis
of the fact that the 1915 field equations are generally covariant. It is ironic then that for most of
the 1916 paper, Einstein reverts to the use of unimodular coordinates (for which
√−g = 1, g being
the determinant of the metric field gµν) with the explicit purpose of simplifying the equations and
calculations.50 Be that as it may, it is worth noting, as Barbour did in 1990,51 that in so far as
general covariance was to play a role in solving the Machian conundrum, it was the relativity of
motion, and not the relativity of inertial mass, that was relevant.
1916 also marked the year of Mach’s death. Einstein wrote an obituary, in which he discussed
in detail Mach’s criticism of Newton’s concept of absolute motion, which in turn rested on the
notion of absolute space. Einstein wholeheartedly subscribed to Mach’s point that physics should
avoid using these absolute concepts, and even makes fun of the “philosophers” with their “treasure
chests of the ‘absolute’ and the ‘a priori”’.52
48Howard [1993], p. 211.
49Einstein [1916a].
50See Brown [2007], Appendix A. Einstein’s views on the meaning of general covariance would undergo considerable
changes. Already in Einstein [1916c], he would emphasise its role in clarifying the conservation principle in GR, in
providing what was a special case of Noether’s second 1918 theorem; see ibid and especially Janssen and Renn [2006],
section 3. See also Norton [1993], especially section 5, for the development of the role of general covariance in
Einstein’s thought.
51Barbour [1990].
52Einstein [1916b].
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3.6 Mach in trouble: 1917 to 1921
Yet Einstein in 1916 had not yet relinquished his 1912 interpretation of Mach’s philosophy in terms
of inertial mass. Einstein and Grossmann had already derived a related effect in the Entwurf
theory53, namely that a mass point’s inertial mass grows if other bodies with inertial mass are close
by. In his 1921 Princeton lectures,54 after de Sitter’s attack on Mach’s principle as defined in 1918
(see below), Einstein considered the limit where the geodesic equation goes over to the Newtonian
equation of a mass point subject to a gravitational field, where gµν = ηµν+γµν and γµν corresponds
to the Newtonian gravitational potential assumed to be small to first order. He derived a form for
the equations of motion which he interpreted as showing that, in GR too, the inertial mass of a
mass point increases if other massive bodies are close by. This result he took as “strong support
for Mach’s ideas as to the relativity of all inertial actions”. He went even further:
If we think these ideas consistently through to the end we must expect the whole inertia,
that is, the whole gµν -field, to be determined by the matter of the universe [...] .
Einstein then showed that this can indeed be achieved for the (static, spatially closed) Einstein
universe.
Of course, this was already a fall-back position. Originally, Einstein had expected that in every
solution of the Einstein equations, i.e. in every possible universe, the mass-energy of matter Tµν
would uniquely determine the gµν -field. De Sitter brought an end to this idea, as will be described
below.
Either way, taking the (partial) relativity of inertial mass of a body as reason to believe that
the gµν -field should be entirely determined by the Tµν-field is a remarkable conceptual jump. But
this notion of gµν supervening on Tµν was far from new in Einstein’s Mach-inspired thinking; it
can be traced back to the Entwurf theory. Later, in 1918, it was taken by Einstein to define
“Mach’s Principle”. What then had happened to his notion of linking Mach’s philosophy with
general covariance?
The issue had become much more complicated. Earlier in 1918, Kretschmann would famously
question whether general covariance had any empirical content at all.55 Kretschmann’s analysis
forced Einstein to clearly distinguish the relativity of motion principle from both the equivalence
principle and from the view that the gravito-inertial field represented by the metric tensor must be
determined exclusively by the distribution of masses in the universe. In 1918, his precise formulation
of “Mach’s Principle” became the claim that the gµν field must be “conditioned and determined”
by the mass-energy-momentum Tµν of matter.
56
Alas, although no one seems to have appreciated it at the time, Tµν cannot be defined indepen-
dently of gµν .
57 Einstein himself recognised this point explicitly in 1954, the year before his death;
in a letter to Felix Pirani he admitted that Mach’s Principle was hopeless for exactly this reason.58
However, even in 1918, other grounds for doubting the validity of the principle already existed. A
solution of Einstein’s 1915 field equations is a static metric field corresponding to flat, matter-free
53See Einstein and Grossmann [1913], p. 6
54Einstein [1922], p.64-66.
55See Kretschmann [1918].
56Einstein [1918].
57This was noted in footnote 6 above; the dire implications for the 1918 Mach’s Principle were spelt out recently
in Lehmkuhl [2011], p. 482.
58See Barbour and Pfister [1995], p. 93.
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Minkowski space-time; this was one reason why in 1917 Einstein felt he had to introduce modified
field equations with a cosmological constant to rescue the principle.59 Alas again, de Sitter would
soon show that the modified field equations admit other vacuum solutions: the degrees of freedom
of the metric field are in general not uniquely determined by the mass-energy of matter.60 In the
years between 1918 and 1922, Einstein was thus forced to admit the metric field gµν as a dynamical
player in its own right according to GR, akin to the electromagnetic field Fµν . Nonetheless, he still
clung to the weak form of Mach’s principle present in the Princeton lectures, which holds only in
the Einstein universe – supposedly the best model of the actual universe.
These lectures are also the place where Einstein for the first time published an explicit, clear
connection between the Machian critique of absolute space and the action–reaction principle AR.
Here, he stated:
[I]t is contrary to the mode of thinking in science to conceive of a thing (the space-time
continuum) which acts itself but which cannot be acted upon. This is the reason why E.
Mach was led to make the attempt to eliminate space as an active cause in the system of
mechanics. [...] In order to develop this idea within the limits of the modern theory of
action through a medium, the properties of the space-time continuum which determine
inertia must be regarded as field properties of space, analogous to the electromagnetic
field.61
This is hardly a faithful account of Mach’s reasoning. More to the point, we witness here what
seems to be an important shift in Einstein’s thinking about the nature of the problematic role
space(time) plays in Newtonian mechanics and special relativity. But the seeds for this shift were
planted at least two years earlier, as we shall now see.
4 The Einstein-Schlick correspondence
4.1 The background
The growing recognition, on Einstein’s part, of the tension between the field equations in GR and
his 1918 version of Mach’s Principle led him, as we have seen, to effectively assign genuine degrees
of freedom to the metric field in the general case (not for the Einstein universe). This development
finds a clear expression in a 1920 paper,62 where Einstein speaks of the electromagnetic and the
gravitational “ether” of GR as in principle different from the ether conceptions of Newton, Hertz,
and Lorentz. The new, generally relativistic or “Machian ether”, Einstein says, differs from its
predecessors in that it interacts (bedingt und wird bedingt) both with matter and with the state
59Einstein [1917].
60Einstein initially tried to attack de Sitter’s solution on various grounds, arguing that it was i) not static (un-
acceptable to Einstein at the time) and ii) that it involved an intrinsic singularity and thus matter. In the end,
Einstein hat to admit that it was an entirely viable mathematical solution to the modified field equations (involving
no intrinsic singularities). He went on to rule out the solution as unphysical because it was not globally static; a
move he repeated when Friedman [1922] published his non-static solution and regretted painfully after Hubble [1929]
published his results on the redshift of galaxies. See Frenkel [2002] for Einstein’s attack on Friedman’s work and
subsequent developments, Einstein and De Sitter [1932] for Einstein’s reaction to Hubble’s results, and the Editorial
note ‘The Einstein-de Sitter-Weyl-Klein debate’ of Volume 7 CPAE for more on the exchange between Einstein and
de Sitter, as well as Janssen [forthcoming].
61Einstein [1922], p. 36.
62Einstein [1920b], pp.11-13.
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of the ether at neighbouring points.63 There can be little doubt that the discovery of the partial
dynamical autonomy of the metric field was an unwelcome surprise for Einstein; that as a devotee
of Mach he had been reluctant to accept that the metric field was not, in the end, “conditioned
and determined” by the mass-energy-momentum Tµν of matter.
But by the time he gave his Princeton lectures in 1921, Einstein had clearly made virtue out of
necessity. He had come to see the interactive nature of the metric field as a blessing in disguise. This
transition in Einstein’s thinking was first brought out in 1920, in the course of a correspondence
Einstein had with Moritz Schlick.
Schlick started out as a physicist, and graduated with a PhD on optics in 1904, under the
supervision of Max Planck — maybe the only physicist that Einstein revered as much as Hendrik
Lorentz. Schlick then turned to philosophy, and was one of the first philosophers to analyse general
relativity; his earliest article stems from 1915.64 In 1917, Schlick wrote another paper for the
widely read journal Die Naturwissenschaften. The article met with so much interest that it was
commissioned to be reprinted as a monograph within the same year, with an enlarged and improved
second edition being published in 1919. This was of course the year of Eddington’s solar eclipse
observations and Einstein’s rise to international fame, so that another, again enlarged, edition
became necessary in 1920.
In Einstein’s first letter to Schlick, he was full of praise of Schlick’s 1915 article on relativity
theory. He writes:
Yesterday I received your paper and have studied it thouroughly already. It is among
the best that has been written on relativity to date. From the philosophical perspective,
nothing nearly as clear seems to have been written on the subject.65
This is the first of at least 26 letters exchanged by Einstein and Schlick between 1917 and the
end of 1920 alone. The frequency of correspondence reached its height in 1920, when Schlick was
preparing the fourth edition of his book, and when Einstein was struggling with the blow that de
Sitter had dealt to Mach’s Principle. An important point in the correspondence had to do with
a footnote which was present in the first three editions of Schlick’s book; it dealt with the way
Einstein had criticised the absolute space of Newtonian mechanics in the thought experiment with
the two fluid bodies we encountered in the last section. Schlick writes:
One does not have to understand Newtonian theory as taking Galilean space — after
all, an unobservable thing — for the cause of the centrifugal forces. Instead, one might
take the talk of absolute space a mere restatement of the bare fact that these forces
exist. [...] One does not need to regard absolute rotation as the cause of the ellipsoidal
shape [of S2]. Instead one can say: the former is defined by the latter.
66
Einstein comments on this remark in a letter to Schlick dated 21 March 1917. He writes:
63The fact that Einstein uses the word ‘ether’ extensively in Einstein [1920b] seems more due to the circumstances
in which the paper was delivered than to the content Einstein wanted to bring the term across; Einstein rarely
used the term in later writings when referring to gµν or Fµν , but sometimes said that whether one says ‘space-time’
or ‘ether’ does not really matter in the end. The fact that Einstein used the term excessively in Einstein [1920b],
however, must be related to it being his inaugural lecture in Leiden, which Lorentz and Ehrenfest had engineered
and which Einstein used to express his reverence for Lorentz.
64See the introduction to Schlick [2006] for a detailed biography of Schlick, alongside corresponding references.
65Einstein to Schlick, 14 December 1915, Vol. 8, Doc. 165, CPAE.
66Schlick [1917], p.178. Translation by DL.
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Your are right with your criticism on page 178 (footnote) is legitimate. On close exami-
nation, the causality requirement is just not sharply defined. The causality requirement
can be satisfied to various degrees. It can only be said that the general th[eory] of
r[elativity] has been more successful than classical mechanics in satisfying it. It might
be a rewarding task for an epistemologist to think this through carefully.67
Schlick may well have seen this as a challenge posed by Einstein to himself. At any rate, he
did think the matter through carefully, and in 1920, while working towards the 4th edition of
his book, Schlick published a paper entitled “Natural-philosophical considerations of the principle
of causality”.68 This paper sparked a new round of discussions between Schlick and Einstein,
especially on the question of the differences between NM and GR.69
4.2 Action–reaction to the rescue
On June 5, 1920, Schlick sent Einstein the paper on the principle of causality, only four days
before it was printed in Die Naturwissenschaften.70 Einstein answered two days later with detailed
comments on the manuscript. One of the issues he focused on is the question of whether the law
of inertia has a different causal status in NM as compared to GR:
Furthermore, on the question of the violation of the postulate of causality through the
law of inertia. In your little book you rightly emphasised that I went too far in my
exposition [of the 1916 thought experiment]. However, I cannot agree with your current
position of the state of affairs. I think it would be correct to say: Newtonian physics has
to attribute objective reality to acceleration, independently of the coordinate system.
This is only possible if one regards absolute space (i.e., the ether) as something real.
Newton does this in a coherent way. It does not matter whether you call that which
you have to refer to in order to give reality to acceleration absolute space, ether or
preferred coordinate system. What remains unsatisfactory is the circumstance that this
something enters only one way (nur einseitig) into the causal chain. [...] The absolute
space of Newton is independent, cannot be influenced, the gµν-field of general relativity
is subject to laws of nature, determined by matter (not only determining).71
Schlick answers within three days. Interestingly, he does not comment at all on Einstein invoking
the action–reaction principle, but reiterates the point he had made in the above mentioned footnote
to his book, claiming that it is compatible with everything Einstein had written in his previous
letter:
. . . absolute space, which Newtonian mechanics of course has to presuppose, does not
have to be considered by the latter as a cause in the sense of the principle of causality.
In other words: Newtonian Mechanics does not have to consider inertial resistance in
67Vol. 8, Doc. 314 CPAE.
68Schlick [1920]
69See Howard [1984], Hentschel [1986] and Hentschel [1990], especially section 4.7.3, for more on the Einstein-Schlick
debate.
70See Call No. 21-575 EA for the corresponding letter, and Vol. 5, p. 576 CPAE for a summary of the letter.
71Einstein to Schlick, June 7 1920, Vol. 10, Doc. 47 CPAE.
14
the context of certain kinds of motion as an effect of an absolute acceleration. It can
instead take the former as the defining criterion of the latter.72
So while Einstein takes it as a given that absolute space acts in NM while spacetime interacts
in GR, Schlick questions the first point. Unfortunately, just as Schlick did not react to Einstein’s
new move of invoking the action–reaction principle, Einstein in his answer to Schlick on 30 June,
1920, does not react to this interesting position either. Instead, he offers an argument of why space
has to be considered as absolute in NM:
If I consider the equation
mass · acceleration = force
then “force” is something absolute (independent of the coordinate system), just like
mass, if only the units (including the unit of length) are fixed. Hence, one also has
to attribute an absolute status to acceleration. The latter is, with length and time,
defined via d
2x
dt2
; thus, one must not also define acceleration via the law of inertia.
Instead, one will have to choose to also consider x and t as absolute, i.e. physically
sensible, quantities. For t this works out, if one does not take into account the difficulty
of simultaneity c = practically ∞ via a clock; but for x this does not work out. One is
forced to attribute a mystical, i.e. empirically inaccessible reality to space.73
We leave the reader to ponder over the validity and relevance of this strange argument, which
appears to suggest a tension between the Galilean coordinate transformations, or rather the non-
invariant transformations for the spatial coordinates, and the absolute nature of the acceleration
caused by Newtonian forces. More pertinently, Einstein continues by pointing out how things fare
better in GR:
By the way, physical space possesses reality according to the general theory of relativity,
too, but not an independent one; for its properties are completely determined by matter.
Space is incorporated into the causal nexus without playing a one-sided role in the causal
chain.
The second half of the first sentence is also striking, as Einstein had previously recognised that
Mach’s principle only holds for certain solutions of the Einstein field equations, not for all of them
— but of course, at the time he considered those solutions for which it held as the only physically
relevant ones. At any rate, we here see the complete position which would first be presented in the
1921 Princeton lectures: in Newtonian mechanics space acts without being acted upon, while in
general relativity it interacts.
In Schlick’s answer of 29 August 1920 (i.e. 2 months later), he succumbs to Einstein.74 Even
though Einstein had not addressed Schlick’s alternative position of the status of absolute space
in Newtonian mechanics, and Schlick himself failed to explicitly acknowledge the action–reaction
principle as the decisive criterion, Schlick announced he was completely convinced by Einstein’s
argument, and even points out that he would delete the critical footnote from further editions of
his book.
72Schlick to Einstein, 10 June 1920, Vol. 10 Doc. 51 CPAE.
73Vol. 10, Doc. 67 CPAE.
74Vol. 10 Doc. 116 CPAE.
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4.3 The observability of the metric field
A noteworthy episode in the Einstein-Schlick correspondence was spurred by a remark in Schlick’s
1920 Die Naturwissenschaften paper, that from “an epistemological point of view it is remarkable
that the gravitational field does not represent something observable in the same sense as the relative
motion of visible bodies”. Einstein replied, in a letter of 7 June of the same year:75
It seems to me unjustified to state that gravitational fields should not be regarded as
observable in the same sense as masses ... .
In turn, Schlick partially concedes the point, but there is a sting in the tail of his reply:
I was probably not right with the assertion that a gravitational field was not observable
in the same sense as masses. This does apply, at most, in the very rough sense that
one may say: I do perceive two objects but not the gravitational field between them.
However, it seems to me a debatable point whether in examining Machian thoughts the
word ‘perceptible’ may be taken in the roughest sense.76
Schlick is correctly wondering what kind of ‘observability’ criterion is operative in Mach’s cri-
tique of Newtonian absolute space. If it is the “rough” one having to do with direct perceivability,
then it is unclear how space-time structure in GR is to avoid Machian condemnation. On the other
hand, suppose the relevant notion of observability is a more subtle one: the gravitational field in
GR is said to be observable because, like the electromagnetic field in the case of charged bodies,
it has an effect on more directly perceivable masses. In this case it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that Newtonian space, insofar as it purports to explain inertia, is also observable, and the Machian
condemnation of it collapses. It seems that in his correspondence with Schlick, Einstein is adopt-
ing something like the second position, abandoning the epistemological flavour of Mach’s original
critique of absolute space in favour of another tack: that based on the action–reaction principle.
If this is correct, it is another example of the plasticity of Einstein’s epistemological reasoning in
the light of new developments in the physics (in this case prompted by de Sitter’s results), and it
anticipates Einstein’s well-documented turn to a more realist philosophy and a weakening of his
empiricism.77
4.4 Whence AR?
As we mentioned in section 3.3 above, Norton argued in 1999 that AR was in the back of Einstein’s
mind well before 1920, and indeed formed the stimulus of his original Machian tendencies. Here is
a further quote from Norton’s study:
This view of the deficiency of earlier theories [their violating the action–reaction princi-
ple] and general relativity’s achievement is not one that grew in the wake of Einstein’s
disenchantment with Mach’s principle. Rather, it was present even in his earliest writ-
ings beneath the concerns for the relative motion of bodies and the observability of
causes.78
75Vol. 10, Doc. 47 CPAE.
76Schlick to Einstein, 10 June 1920 (Vol. 10, Doc. 51 CAPE).
77See Holton [1968] and van Dongen [2010], p.37-40.
78Norton [1993], p. 810
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Indeed, this view is consistent with Einstein’s 1922 claim, in the quotation found at the end of
section 3.4 above, which (questionably) assigns AR as the true source of Mach’s own misgivings
about the role of absolute space in Newtonian mechanics. For his part, Norton quotes from one of
the 1913 Einstein papers referred to in section 3.3 above, the relevant passage being:
It is a priori to be expected, even though it is not strictly necessary, that inertial
resistance is nothing else but resistance against relative acceleration of the body A in
question with respect to the totality of all other bodies B,C etc. It is well-known
that E. Mach, in his history of mechanics, was the first who defended this position with
sharpness and clarity, so that I can only refer to his work. [...] I will call this position the
“hypothesis of the relativity of inertia”. [...] [A] theory in which the relativity of inertia
is realised is more satisfactory than the current theory, for in the latter the inertial
system is introduced; its state of motion, on the one hand, is not conditioned by the
status of observable objects (and therefore caused by nothing accessible to perception)
but, on the other hand, it is supposed to determine the behaviour of material points.79
But is this an unambiguous enunciation of the AR principle? Note the emphasis, once again,
on the epistemological issue of observability and perception, which seems to foreshadow the way
Einstein criticises NM in his 1916 review article. Furthermore, it is puzzling that there does not
seem to be any other explicit commitment to the AR principle in Einstein’s pre-1920 writings,
including his effusive letters to Mach.80 And as for Einstein’s own 1921 interpretation of Mach,
this could plausibly be attributed to a mixture of ignorance and opportunism. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, it seems to us that if there was a single core belief (of course, there could have
been more) underpinning Einstein’s adoption of the Machian relativity of inertia, it was probably
the equivalence principle, and not AR.81
In his letters leading up to the paper in which the above quote appears, Einstein keeps em-
phasising that the fundamental idea on which everything else rests is that gravitational fields and
“acceleration fields”82 are equivalent. Suppose the familiar notion is accepted that gravitation is
some kind of interaction between massive bodies, despite the fact that Einstein is embarking on
a radically non-Newtonian theory of gravity. Then if gravitation and acceleration/inertia are to
be truly equivalent, inertia must also be an interaction between massive bodies. Indeed, Einstein
seems to incorporate such logic in his letter to Mach from 25 June 1913:
Next year the eclipse is supposed to show whether light rays are bent by the sun,
whether, in other words, the fundamental assumption of the equivalence between ac-
celeration of the frame of reference on the one hand and the gravitational field on the
79Einstein [1913], p.1260-1261.
80It is true that Einstein rejected his own 1912 scalar field theory (mentioned footnote 32 above) when he discovered
that it failed to satisfy Newton’s third law of motion concerning action–reaction. But this is a case of the existence of
both action and reaction, which happen not to be equal and opposite, thus giving rise to an unacceptable force-free
accelerative phenomenon. As we stressed in section 2, AR is not be to be conflated with Newton’s third law, which
is a much stronger constraint on the way bodies act on each other.
81Hoefer [1994], especially in section 1.1, argues that Einstein’s conception of the equivalence principle between
1907 and 1912 already contains an “implicit Machianism”. We hope to clarify in this section how the equivalence
principle and the relativity of inertia were likely related to each other in Einstein’s mind.
82Einstein uses this term for example in a letter to Lorentz from 18 February 1912 (Vol. 5 Doc. 360 CPAE) when
discussing the alleged equivalence between the two. Note, however, that Einstein puts ‘acceleration fields’ in quotes
himself.
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other is indeed right. If it is, then your brilliant investigations on the foundations of
mechanics receive — despite Planck’s unjustified criticism — a shining confirmation.
For it follows with necessity that inertia has its origin in a kind of interaction of the
bodies, completely in accordance of your thoughts on Newton’s bucket experiment.
Note in particular the end of the first sentence and the beginning of the second: If the equiva-
lence principle is confirmed, then so is the relativity of inertia.
Of course, this inference holds only if both the equivalence principle and the claim that gravita-
tion is an interaction hold. There is a short publication in which Einstein replies to criticism from
Ernst Reichenba¨cher from 1920,83 the year of his intense exchange with Schlick, where Einstein
is explicit in regard to the claim that gravitation is an interaction, with the clarification that the
interaction is said to be mediated by gµν . The outcome, incidentally, is a revised description of the
1916 thought experiment of the two rotating spheres:
Mr. Reichenba¨cher misunderstood my considerations regarding two celestial bodies
rotating with respect to one another. One of these bodies is rotating in the sense of
Newtonian Mechanics, and thus flattened by centrifugal effects, the other is not. This is
what the inhabitants would measure with rigid rods, tell each other about it, and then
ask themselves about the real cause of the different behaviour of the celestial bodies.
(This has nothing to do with Lorentz contraction.) Newton answered this question by
declaring absolute space real, with respect to which one but not the other allegedly
rotates. I myself am of the Machian opinion, which in the language of relativity theory
can be put in the following way: All masses of the world together determine the gµν -
field, which is, judged from the first celestial body, a different one than judged from
the second one; for the motion of the masses producing the gµν -field differ significantly.
Inertia is, in my opinion, a (mediated) interaction between the masses of the world in the
same sense as those effects which in Newtonian theory are considered as gravitational
effects.
A more concise statement of the interaction claim was made in 1921,84, in the context of
providing an argument supporting what we today call the Einstein universe, i.e., the universe in
which Mach’s Principle would still hold despite de Sitter’s result:
[I]t seems, therefore, natural to trace back the complete inertia of a body to an interac-
tion between itself and the other bodies in the world, just as since Newton gravitation
is traced back completely to an interaction between the bodies.
To summarise, it seems fair to say that Einstein did not need a variant of the action–reaction
principle as a reason to adopt the relativity of inertia in 1913. His strong belief in the equivalence
between gravity and inertia, together with his retention of the Newtonian tenet that gravity is an
interaction between bodies, could be seen as reason enough.85 Furthermore, it is the pairing of
83Einstein [1920a].
84Einstein [1921] p. 12 see also Vol.7, Doc. 31 CPAE for a similar statement from December 1919 / January 1920.
85Compare Norton [1989b], p. 24: “[I]t was natural for expect that the extended theory, which dealt with general
gravitational effects, would explain the observed disposition of inertial frames of reference in terms of the matter
distribution of the universe. For the structure that determined this disposition would behave in many aspects like
a traditional gravitational field and therefore be strongly influenced by any motion of its sources, the masses of the
universe.”
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the equivalence principle and the principle of the relativity of inertia, together with the principle
of relativity, that Einstein mentions repeatedly up until 1920 as the cornerstones of GR, whereas
AR only really takes centre stage in 1920 in the correspondence with Schlick and in subsequent
publications. For these reasons, we are inclined to believe that the 1920 correspondence brought out
a watershed in Einstein’s thinking, marking an unprecedented shift in Einstein’s interpretation of
the superiority of GR over preceding theories of space-time: its superiority now rested on satisfaction
of the action–reaction principle, rather than implementation of Mach’s original analysis of inertia.
5 Final remarks
Einstein’s frequent references to GR’s vindication of the action–reaction principle in the years
following his 1921 Princeton lectures have been noted in a number of studies.86 A particularly
telling quotation is from a letter Einstein wrote a year before his death to Georg Jaffe:
You consider the transition to special relativity as the most essential thought of
relativity, not the transition to general relativity. I consider the reverse to be correct. I
see the most essential thing in the overcoming of the inertial system, a thing which acts
upon all processes, but undergoes no reaction. The concept is in principle no better
than that of the centre of the universe in Aristotelian physics.87
For Einstein, the glory of GR rested partly on its alleged superiority to preceding theories of
space-time which involve absolute structure. His 1924 essay “On the ether” contains a particularly
clear denunciation of Newtonian mechanics in terms of its violation of AR.88 But caution should be
exercised when extrapolating backwards, as it were, in the history of physics. It doesn’t automati-
cally follow from the fact that GR satisfies AR, that NM and SR don’t, as we mentioned in section
1 above. To repeat, Einstein was content in his 1905 development of SR to explicitly borrow the
inertial frames from NM, without any fretting about the correct metaphysics of action. Of course, if
AR is to be respected in these theories, inertia must be taken as a brute fact, a position advocated,
in different ways, by Schlick and others, as we have seen. Such a position is surely defensible in the
context of these theories.
The two epigrammatic Einstein quotations cited at the beginning of this essay underscore how
Einstein’s thinking changed between 1905 and 1913, and again between 1913 and 1924. In the years
1912 and 1913, when Mach’s influence on him may have been greatest, Einstein had convinced
himself that the phenomenon of inertia required a causal explanation, while regarding as absurd
the notion of immaterial space acting as such a cause. By 1924, he was stressing that the metric
field in GR is as real and efficacious as the electromagnetic field, and in particular could indeed
be seen as the origin of inertia. (But it is worth stressing here that Einstein did not view GR as
furnishing a geometric explanation of gravitational phenomena; he continued to reject the notion
of space, or space-time, as providing the cause of inertia.89)
Nowadays, acceptance of Einstein’s 1924 claim should be seen to rest not simply on the nature of
gµν and its geodesics, but rather on the so-called geodesic theorem, which demonstrates that the form
86See in particular Norton [1993] and Hoefer [1995].
87See Stachel [1986], p. 377.
88Einstein [1924], p. 88.
89For details of Einstein’s arguments against seeing GR as a ‘geometrization of gravity’, see Lehmkuhl [n.d.]; for
related arguments, see Anderson [1999] and Brown [2009].
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of Einstein’s field equations, along, it must be noted, with other plausible universal assumptions
about matter fields, imply that the world-lines of test particles are time-like geodesics as defined
by the metric field.90 Note that the theorem deals with an idealisation; it states that extended,
but truly freely-falling bodies only approximately move inertially.91 In fact, it is a subject worthy
of investigation as to whether the details of the theorem are strictly consistent with Einstein’s
insistence that a violation of AR holds in theories with absolute space-time structure.92 But such
an investigation must be pursued elsewhere. It is our hope that in the present essay, some further
light has been shed on the circumstances which led Einstein to bring to the fore the role of the
action–reaction principle in his new theory of gravity.
6 Acknowledgments
H.R.B. thanks Partha Ghose, and Peter Ronald deSouza, Director of the IIAS, for the invitation to
speak at the 2012 conference “The Nature of Reality: The Perennial Question”. He thanks Julian
Barbour for very helpful discussions of the first draft of the paper, in which a number of mistakes
were noted and suggestions for improvements were made. He also acknowledges fruitful discussions
with Paul Lodge and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra concerning Leibniz’s theory of causation. D.L.
thanks the Einstein Papers Project, in particular Diana Kormos Buchwald and Tilman Sauer, for
training without which his part in this work would not have been possible, and the Center for
Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh for hospitality during part of the work on the
article. He also wishes to thank John Norton in particular, for patient and inspiring discussions
on Einstein and the interpretation of Einstein’s work. Finally both authors thank John Norton,
Tilman Sauer and particularly Oliver Pooley for detailed comments on an earlier draft of the paper
which led to a number of improvements.
References
Anandan, J. and Brown, H. [1995], ‘On the reality of space-time geometry and the wavefunction’,
Foundations of Physics 25(2), 349–360.
Anderson, J. L. [1999], ‘Does general relativity require a metric’, arXiv preprint gr-qc/9912051 .
Barbour, J. [1990], The part played by Mach’s Principle in the genesis of relativistic cosmology
in the genesis of relativistic cosmology, in S. B. A. M. B Bertotti, R Balbinot, ed., ‘Modern
Cosmology in Retrospect’, Cambridge University Press, pp. 47–66.
Barbour, J. [1995], General relativity as a perfectly Machian theory, in J. Barbour and H. Pfis-
ter, eds, ‘Mach’s Principle: From Newton’s Bucket to Quantum Gravity’, Birkha¨user, Boston,
pp. 214–236.
Barbour, J. [2001], The Discovery of Dynamics: A Study from a Machian Point of View of the
Discovery and the Structure of Dynamical Theories, Oxford University Press, New York.
90See Malament [2012].
91See Brown [2007], p. 141, and particularly Tamir [2012].
92See the brief comments in Brown [2007], pp. 141, 142
20
Barbour, J. and Pfister, H., eds [1995], Mach’s Principle. From Newton’s Buckett to quantum
Gravity, Vol. 6 of Einstein Studies, Birkha¨user.
Born, M. [1971], The Born-Einstein letters: correspondence between Albert Einstein and Max and
Hedwig Born from 1916 to 1955, Walker New York.
Brown, G. [1992], ‘Is there a pre-established harmony of aggregates in the Leibnizian dynamics, or
do non-substantial bodies interact?’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 30(1), 53–75.
Brown, H. R. [2007], Physical Relativity. Space-time structure from a dynamical perspective, Oxford
University Press, USA.
Brown, H. R. [2009], ‘The behaviour of rods and clocks in general relativity, and the meaning of
the metric field’, arXiv preprint: 0911.4440 . Forthcoming in the Einstein Studies Series.
Brown, H. R. and Pooley, O. [2006], Minkowski space-time: a glorious non-entity, in D. Dieks, ed.,
‘The Ontology of Spacetime’, Vol. I of Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, Elsevier.
Earman, J. and Norton, J. [1987], ‘What price substantivalism? the hole story’, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 38, 515–525.
Einstein, A. [1912a], ‘Gibt es eine Gravitationswirkung, die der elektrodynamischen Induktion-
swirkung analog ist?’, Vierteljahrschrift fu¨r gerichtliche Medizin und o¨ffentliches Sanita¨tswesen
44, 37–40. Reprinted as Vol. 4, Doc. 7 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1912b], ‘Zur Theorie des statischen Gravitationsfeldes’, Annalen der Physik 38, 443–
458. Reprinted as Vol. 4, Doc. 4 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1913], ‘Zum gegenwa¨rtigen Stande des Gravitationsproblems’, Physikalische Zeitschrift
14(1249-1266). Reprinted as Vol. 4, Doc. 17 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1914], ‘Die formale Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie’, Sitzungsberichte
der Ko¨niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften pp. 799–801. Reprinted as Vol. 6,
Document 9 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1916a], ‘Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie’, Annalen der Physik
49(7), 769–822. Reprinted as Vol. 6, Doc. 30 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1916b], ‘Ernst Mach’, Physikalische Zeitschrift 17, 101–104. Reprinted as Vol. 6, Doc.
29 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1916c], ‘Hamiltonsches Prinzip und allgemeine Relativita¨tstheorie’, Sitzungsberichte
der Ko¨niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften pp. 1111–1116. Reprinted as Document
41 (page 409) of Volume 6, CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1917], ‘Kosmologische Betrachtungen zur allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie’, Sitzungs-
berichte der Ko¨niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften . Reprinted as Document 43
(page 541) of Volume 6 CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1918], ‘Prinzipielles zur allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie’, Annalen der Physik 55, 241–
244. Reprinted as Vol. 7, Doc. 4 CPAE.
21
Einstein, A. [1920a], ‘Antwort auf Ernst Reichenba¨cher, “Inwiefern la¨ßt sich die moderne
Gravitations-theorie ohne die Relativita¨t begru¨nden?”’, Die Naturwissenschaften 8(1010-1011).
Reprinted as Vol. 7, Doc. 49, CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1920b], A¨ther und Relativita¨tstheorie, Springer, Springer. Reprinted as Document 38,
Volume 7, CPAE.
Einstein, A. [1921], Geometrie und Erfahrung, Reprinted as Vol. 7, Doc. 52 CPAE, Springer, Berlin.
Einstein, A. [1922], Vier Vorlesungen u¨ber Relativita¨tstheorie gehalten im Mai 1921 an der Univer-
sita¨t Princeton, F. Vieweg. Reprinted as Vol.7, Doc. 71 CPAE; and in various editions as “The
Meaning of Relativity” by Princeton University Press.
Einstein, A. [1924], ‘U¨ber den A¨ther’, Schweizerische Naturforschende Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen
105, 85–93. English translation by Simon Saunders, in S Saunders and H Brown (eds.) Philosophy
of Vacuum, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991; pp. 13-20.
Einstein, A. [1948], ‘Quantenmechanik und Wirklichkeit’, Dialectica 2(3-4), 320–324.
Einstein, A. [1949], Autobiographical notes, in P. A. Schilpp, ed., ‘Albert Einstein, philosopher-
scientist’, Vol. 7 of The Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court Publishing, La Salle, Illinois.
Einstein, A. [1993], The Swiss Years: Correspondence, 1902-1914, in M. J. Klein, A. J. Kox,
R. Schulmann, J. Renn, P. Brenni, K. Hentschel, J. Renn and L. Ruetsche, eds, ‘The Collected
Papers of Albert Einstein’, Vol. 5, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Einstein, A. [1995], The Swiss Years: Writings, 1912-1914, in M. J. Klein, A. J. Kox, J. Renn,
R. Schulmann, S. Bergia, J. Illy, M. Janssen, J. D. Norton and T. Sauer, eds, ‘The Collected
Papers of Albert Einstein’, Vol. 4, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Einstein, A. [1998], The Berlin Years: Correspondence, 1914-1918, in R. Schulmann, A. J. Kox,
M. Janssen, J. Illy, K. von Meyenn, G. de Syon and G. Castagnetti, eds, ‘The Collected Papers
of Albert Einstein’, Vol. 8, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Einstein, A. [2006], The Berlin Years: Correspondence, May-December 1920, and Supplementary
Correspondence, 1909-1920, in D. K. Buchwald, T. Sauer, Z. Rosenkranz, J. Illy and V. Holmes,
eds, ‘The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein’, Vol. 10, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Einstein, A. and De Sitter, W. [1932], ‘On the relation between the expansion and the mean density
of the universe’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
18(3), 213.
Einstein, A. and Grossmann, M. [1913], Entwurf einer verallgemeinerten Relativita¨tstheorie und
einer Theorie der Gravitation, Teubner, Leipzig. Reprinted in CPAE, Vol. 4, Doc. 13.
Fine, A. [1996], The shaky game: Einstein, realism, and the quantum theory, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Frenkel, V. [2002], Einstein and Friedmann, in ‘Einstein Studies in Russia’, Vol. 10 of Einstein
Studies, Birkhauser.
22
Friedman, A. [1922], ‘U¨ber die Kru¨mmung des Raumes’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik A Hadrons and
Nuclei 10(1), 377–386.
Gerhardt, C. [1858], Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, Leibnizens Gesammelte Werke, Verlag
von H.W. Schmidt, Halle.
Hall, A. and Hall, M. [1962], Unpublished scientific papers of Isaac Newton: a selection from the
Portsmouth collection in the University library, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Henry, J. [2011], ‘Gravity and De gravitatione: the development of Newton’s ideas on action at a
distance’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42(1), 11–27.
Hentschel, K. [1986], ‘Die Korrespondenz Einstein-Schlick: zum Verha¨ltnis der Physik zur Philoso-
phie’, Annals of Science 43(5), 475–488.
Hentschel, K. [1990], Interpretationen und Fehlinterpretationen der speziellen und der allgemeinen
Relativita¨tstheorie durch Zeitgenossen Albert Einsteins, Birkha¨user, Basel.
Hoefer, C. [1994], ‘Einstein’s struggle for a Machian gravitation theory’, Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 25(3), 287–335.
Hoefer, C. [1995], Einstein’s formulations of Mach’s principle, in J. Barbour and H. Pfister, eds,
‘Mach’s Principle: From Newton’s Bucket to Quantum Gravity’, Vol. 6 of Einstein Studies,
Birkha¨user, pp. 67–90.
Holton, G. [1968], ‘Mach, Einstein, and the search for reality’, Daedalus 97(2), 636–673.
Home, D. and Robinson, A. [1995], ‘Einstein and Tagore: Man, nature and mysticism’, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2(2), 167–167.
Howard, D. [1984], ‘Realism and Conventionalism in Einstein’s Philosophy of Science: The Einstein-
Schlick Correspondence in Philosophy of Science History of Science’, Philosophia Naturalis 21(2-
4), 616–629.
Howard, D. [1993], ‘Was Einstein really a realist?’, Perspectives on Science 1(2), 204–251.
Hubble, E. [1929], ‘A relation between distance and radial velocity among extra-galactic nebulae’,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 15(3), 168–173.
Ishiguro, H. [1993], ‘Pre-established harmony versus constant conjunction: a reconsideration of the
distinction between rationalism and empiricism’, Proceedings of the British Academy LXIII, 239–
262.
Janssen, M. [forthcoming], “No success like failure...”: Einstein’s quest for general relativity,
1907-1920’. Forthcoming in the Cambridge Companion to Einstein. Preprint at http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4377.
Janssen, M. and Renn, J. [2006], Untying the knot: How Einstein found his way back to field
equations discarded in the Zurich notebook, in J. Renn, ed., ‘The Genesis of General Relativity’,
Vol. 2, Springer.
23
Kragh, H. [2012a], ‘Geometry and astronomy: Pre-Einstein speculations of non-Euclidean space’,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1205.4909 .
Kragh, H. [2012b], ‘Zo¨llner’s universe’, Physics in Perspective 14(4), 392–420.
Kretschmann, E. [1918], ‘U¨ber den physikalischen Sinn der Relativita¨tspostulate. A. Einsteins neue
und seine urspru¨ngliche Relativita¨tstheorie’, Annalen der Physik 358(16), 575–614.
Lehmkuhl, D. [2011], ‘Mass-Energy-Momentum: Only there because of Spacetime?’, The British
journal for the philosophy of science 62(3), 454–488.
Lehmkuhl, D. [forthcoming], A lost love: Mach’s principle in Einstein’s work.
Lehmkuhl, D. [n.d.], ‘Why Einstein did not believe that general relativity geometrizes gravity’,
unpublished draft .
Mach, E. [1872], Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit, Calve’sche
Buchhandlung, Prag. Translation as ‘History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of
Energy’, P. Jourdain, Chicago: Open Court (1911).
Malament, D. [2012], A remark about the “geodesic principle” in general relativity, in ‘Analysis
and Interpretation in the Exact Sciences: Essays in Honor of William Demopoulos’, Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 245–252.
Norton, J. [1989b], What was Einstein’s principle of equivalence?, in ‘Einstein Studies’, Vol. 1.
Norton, J. [1993], ‘General covariance and the foundations of general relativity: eight decades of
dispute’, Reports on progress in physics 56(7), 791.
Norton, J. [1995a], Eliminative induction as a method of discovery: How Einstein discovered general
relativity, in J. Leplin, ed., ‘The Creation of Ideas in Physics: Studies for a Methodology of
Theory Construction’, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 29–70.
Norton, J. [1995b], Mach’s principle before Einstein, in J. Barbour and H. Pfister, eds, ‘Mach’s
Principle: From Newton’s Bucket to Quantum Gravity’, Vol. 6 of Einstein Studies, Birkha¨user,
Boston.
Norton, J. [forthcoming], Philosophy in Einstein’s science, in P. MacEwen, ed., ‘Alternatives to
Materialist Philosophies of Science’, The Mellen Press.
Patrizi, F. [1943], ‘On physical space’, Journal of the History of Ideas 4, 224–225. Translated by
Benjamin Brickman.
Pooley, O. [forthcoming], The Reality of Spacetime, Oxford University Press.
Renn, J. [2007], The third way to general relativity: Einstein and Mach in context, in J. Renn and
M. Schemmel, eds, ‘The Genesis of General Relativity’, Vol. 3 of Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Springer.
24
Rynasiewicz, R. [1995a], ‘By their properties, causes and effects: Newton’s scholium on time, space,
place and motion — I. The text’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26, 133–
153.
Rynasiewicz, R. [1995b], ‘By their properties, causes and effects: Newton’s scholium on time,
space, place and motion — II. The context’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part
A 26, 295–321.
Schlick, M. [1917], Raum und Zeit in der gegenwa¨rtigen Physik, Springer, Berlin.
Schlick, M. [1920], ‘Naturphilosophische Betrachtungen u¨ber das Kausalprinzip’, Die Naturwis-
senschaften 8(24), 461–474.
Schlick, M. [2006], Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe, Vol. I/2, Springer.
Squires, E. [1994], Some comments on the de Broglie-Bohm picture by an admiring spectator, in
A. van der Merwe and A. Garuccio, eds, ‘Waves and Particles in Light and Matter’, Plenum,
New York.
Stachel, J. [1986], Einstein and the quantum: fifty years of struggle, in ‘From Quarks to Quasars:
Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics’, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 349–
81.
Stachel, J. [1989], Einstein’s search for general covariance, in D. Howard and J. Stachel, eds,
‘Einstein and the History of General Relativ’, Vol. 1 of Einstein Studies, Birkha¨user, pp. 63–100.
Stein, H. [1967], ‘Newtonian space-time’, Texas Quarterly 10, 174 to 200. Reprinted in Robert
Palter, ed., 1970, The Annus Mirabilis of Sir Isaac Newton 1666 to 1966 (MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.), pp. 258 to 284.
Tamir, M. [2012], ‘Proving the principle: Taking geodesic dynamics too seriously in Einstein’s
theory’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43(2), 137–154.
van Dongen, J. [2010], Einstein’s Unification, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wolters, G. [1987], Mach I, Mach II, Einstein und die Relativita¨tstheorie, Walter de Gruyter.
Woolhouse, R. S. [1985], ‘Pre-established harmony retuned: Ishiguro versus the tradition’, Studia
leibnitiana pp. 204–219.
25
